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COMMENTS
INSURANCE-UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSEMENT:
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Since the time the automobile began to revolutionize the American
scene, legislators, insurance companies, law enforcement agencies and
private citizens have been concerned with the problems generated by the
uninsured motorist. One problem which caused particular concern was
the financially irresponsible motorist-the driver who injured his inno-
cent victim and was impervious to civil punishment, because he was un-
insured and satisfaction proof.
The current, and indeed it appears, best solution to this problem is to
be found in the uninsured motorist endorsement to the standard auto-
mobile insurance policy, by which the insurance industry faced, and has
apparently successfully stemmed the clamor in the legislative halls across
the country for an answer to this problem. This comment will explain the
insurance agreement, how it works and trace the few existing decisions
on the points raised.
The standard uninsured motorist endorsement consists of an insuring
agreement, exclusions, limits of liability, provisions for other insurance,
arbitration, a trust agreement and applicable sections of the conditions to
the policy. The insuring agreement is:
to pay all sums which the insured . . . shall be legally entitled to recover as
damages from the operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury
... caused by accident ... provided determination as to whether insured . . .
is legally entitled to recover such damages . . . shall be made by agreement
between the insured . . . and the company or, if they fail to agree, by arbi-
tration.'
The endorsement is ineffective when the insured, without the written
consent of the company, makes any settlement with or prosecutes to
judgment any action against any person who may be legally liable.2 The
limit of liability in most policies conforms to the limit of liability of the
1 The clause is taken from the United Services Automobile Association's Family
Automobile Policy, Part IV, "Protection Against Uninsured Motorists," Coverage J-
UNINSURED MOTORISTS, Form No. 401-A-i; NW (5-1-58 Rev. 1-1-60) Rev. 5-61-307M.
USAA is a reciprocal insurance association with home offices located at USAA Build-
ing, 4119 Broadway, San Antonio 15, Texas. The policy will be hereinafter cited as
USAA policy.
2USAA Policy, Part IV, Coverage J, Exclusions (b).
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financial responsibility laws where the coverage is written,8 but some of
the more recent policies have higher limits and the extent of liability
conforms to the amounts stated in the policy. 4
Perhaps the most widely debated and discussed provision in the whole
uninsured motorist endorsement is the arbitration section. By its terms,
should a claimant and/or the company disagree on either the question of
tortfeasor's liability or the amount of damages, then on written demand
of either party, the disputed matters are to be settled by arbitration in
accord with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judg-
ment on the award may be entered in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion.5
In some jurisdictions however, arbitration agreements are contrary to
the local law. Thus in Arkansas, 6 Florida, 7 Illinois, 8 Kentucky,9 Okla-
homa, 10 and Utah" it is held that agreements to arbitrate future disputes
are void and violate public policy. As a result it would appear that in
these jurisdictions, the insured would have the option of accepting the
award or disregarding the arbitration clause and suing the insurer.
Suppose an accident happens. When the loss occurs it seems a bit un-
realistic to maintain that the happy relation of insurer and insured re-
mains the same as prior to the loss, because their relationship after the
accident is tantamount to that of the insurer dealing with a victim claim-
ing under a bodily injury provision. 1 2 Indeed for the insured to recover
under the endorsement, he must convince the company that: "(1) he is
legally entitled to recover damages (2) from the owner or operator of an
uninsured automobile (3) because of bodily injury (4) caused by acci-
dent, and (5) arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such
uninsured automobile.' 8
3Cheek, ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE & COMPENSATION LAW, Recovery
Procedure Under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage of Family Liability Policy, 281
(1960).
4 USAA Policy, Part IV, Coverage J, LIMITS OF LIABILITY (a).
5 USAA Policy, Part IV, Coverage J, ARBITRATION.
6 Miller v. American Ins. Co., 124 F. S. 160 (W.D. Ark. 1954); Papan v. Resolute Ins.
Co., 219 Ark. 907, 245 S.W. 2d 565 (1952).
7 Flaherty v. Metal Products Corp., 83 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1955).
8 Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 III. 152, 139 N.E. 95 (1923).
9 Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. 2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944); Ison v. Wright, 21 Ky. L. Rep.
1362, 55 S.W. 202 (1900).
10 Wilson v. Gregg, 255 P. 2d 517 (Okla. 1952).
11 Latter v. Holsum Bread Co., 108 Utah 364, 160 P. 2d 421 (1945).
12 Miller, The New "Uninsured Motorist" Endorsement to Family Automobile Poli-
cies-The 1960 Look, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 134 (1957).
13 d. at 136.
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The victim, finding the tortfeasor to be uninsured and satisfaction proof,
seeks a claim under the endorsement, but the company in good faith re-
sists insured's claim as invalid on grounds of insured's liability or damages.
At this point either party could invoke the arbitration provisions except in
those jurisdictions where such agreements are void. 14 But in jurisdictions
where contracts to arbitrate future disputes are legal, either party may
invoke this provision as a condition precedent to recovery. If the adverse
party fails to appear the complainant can get an award and sue the other,
using the award and defendant's refusal to appear at the arbitration pro-
ceeding as evidence in the suit. If the defendant tries to make the arbitra-
tion provision a bar to the plaintiff's suit, it is void. 15
In those jurisdictions where contracts to arbitrate future disputes are
void it has been suggested that the remedy, if the insurance company will
consent, is to sue the uninsured if known. If unknown then "John Doe"
and the clerk of the court should be served with a motion for judgment
and the company notified of the suit as if it were a party defendant.16 In
explaining the purpose of notifying the company, Mr. Cheek states:
If the company had the right under the liability feature of the policy to appear
for and on behalf of its insured in case of litigation, then the company required
the notice to be given for the purpose of enabling it to appear in the litigation
and to assist by the employment of counsel.
17
Suppose the insurance company will not consent to a suit by the in-
sured against the tortfeasor. Ostensibly, if the insured proceeds, he vio-
lates the policy.18 As the cases discussed below will show, however, the
insurer's failure to consent would estop it from pleading the breach as a
defense, especially where the company suffers no harm as a result of the
suit. As Mr. Cheek describes it: "the test should be whether the insured's
suit, brought without the consent of the company, resulted in a 'material
prejudice' to the company."' 19
The insured in his suit against the tortfeasor must establish the tort-
feasor's liability and the amount of damages. A judgment for the insured
does not bind the company; however, it may be used as evidence in the
insured's suit against the insurer. If the insured must proceed against the
company, his proof must consist of the contract, evidence the accident
occurred, evidence the tortfeasor was uninsured and the sum of his dam-
ages. The judgment would, it seems, be satisfactory proof that the acci-
14 Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Utah. Cases cited notes 6-11
supra.
15 Merchants & Mfr. Ins. v. Burns, 205 Okla. 31, 234 P. 2d 409 (1951).
16 Cheek, supra n. 3. 17 Id. at 288.
18USAA Policy, Part IV, Coverage J, ExcLusIONs (b).
19 Cheek, supra n. 3 at 289.
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dent occurred, and would be prima facie evidence on the question of
damages.20
It is probably safe to assume that the great majority of cases involving
an uninsured motorist are settled in an amicable fashion. Yet the dearth
of cases on this matter in no way requires such a conclusion because the
insurance is relatively new and the court calendars are comparatively
crowded. In most cases however, it would seem that where a claim is
made, the insurer, for obvious reasons, would naturally desire to prevent
the insured's claim from reaching a jury, whereas the insured might great-
ly prefer a plaintiff-sympathetic jury to the cold rationality of an arbitra-
tion panel. The four cases discussed below are apparently the only deci-
sions to date in which the courts have judicially interpreted the arbitration
provisions of the uninsured motorist endorsement. In each the possibilities
of these notions are at least dimly discernible and in all the cases, plaintiff-
insureds have successfully forsaken the arbitration provisions and juries
have decided the insurer's liability.
The oldest of these cases is Boughton v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange.
21
Here, plaintiff Boughton was injured in a collision with an allegedly un-
insured motorist. Plaintiff filed suit against the tortfeasor, notified the
company and offered to let it either prosecute or defend the action, both
of which it declined to do. The insurer rightfully demanded arbitration
but the plaintiff refused contending she had a right to sue to determine
the legal liability of the tortfeasor. Plaintiff was successful in suit against
the tortfeasor and in this action seeks to collect from the insurer. The
defendant moved to dismiss because it was not bound by the judgment
against the tortfeasor and should be permitted to re-litigate the issues of
liability and damages. Defendant also contended there was no arbitration
as the policy required and that plaintiff had violated the "no action with-
out consent" provision in the policy and that it was, therefore, discharged.
The trial court dismissed; plaintiff appealed and the Oklahoma Supreme
Court reversed. The court reiterated that under the holding of Wilson v.
Gregg2 2 a contract to arbitrate future disputes is void and contravenes
public policy because it deprives insured of a judicial examination of the
issues involved. It stated further that since the "no action without consent
of the company" clause would restrict insured's legal rights, it was void;
and that the
judgment against the uninsured motorist determined that plaintiff was entitled
to recover ... and established the amount .... Exchange cannot now say ...
that it is entitled to relitigate these issues when it agreed to pay that which has
already been determined. We therefore conclude that the question of damages
20 Ibid.
21354 P. 2d 1085 (Okla. 1960). 22255 P. 2d 517 (Okla. 1952).
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and legal liability of the uninsured motorist may not be re-litigated in the
present action .... 23
Having surrendered its opportunity to defend or at least, appear in plain-
tiff's action, the Oklahoma court appears to have applied the doctrine of
res judicata to plaintiff's claim on both the question of liability and
damages.
Levy v. American Automobile Ins. Co.,24 decided one year later in
Illinois, bears marked resemblance to the Boughton case. In both juris-
dictions, contracts to arbitrate future disputes are void. 25 In the Boughton
case, either party could invoke the arbitration provision, but in the Levy
case, only the insured had the option to invoke the clause. Levy was
driving his car and was struck by a car owned by Smith, but driven by
Perkins. When letters sent by plaintiff's attorney to the tortfeasors re-
questing them to have their insurance companies contact him went un-
answered, plaintiff filed suit. Perkins and Smith told plaintiff's attorney
they were uninsured and notice was then sent to defendant, insurer, that
plaintiff would seek payment under the uninsured motorist provision.
Defendant's adjuster asked for, but was denied arbitration by plaintiff,
and then claimed plaintiff needed defendant's consent before prosecuting
the action to judgment and that permission would be denied without ar-
bitration. Plaintiff then got a default judgment against Perkins and Smith,
which included damages for loss of use and repairs to the car. Plaintiff, in
the instant litigation, seeks recovery from defendant under the uninsured
motorist endorsement. The insurance company's defenses were the same
as in the Boughton case; that is, violation of the arbitration provision, and
violation of the "no action without the company's consent" section. The
trial court found for plaintiff and defendant appealed. The Illinois Ap-
pellate Court discarded the first defense, reminding defendant of the rule
of Cocalis v. Nazlides,2 and that the option for arbitration was in insured,
not the insurer. It also held that defendant could not wrongfully refuse
plaintiff permission to sue without violating an implied condition in the
policy, citing Corbin2 with approval. Though the rationales differ, the
result is, for practical purposes, the same as in the Boughton case.
23 354 P. 2d 1085, 1090-91.
24 31 Ill. App. 2d 157, 175 N.E. 2d 607 (1961).
25 Wilson v. Gregg, 255 P. 2d 517 (Okla. 1952); Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152, 139
N.E. 95 (1923).
26 Cocalis v. Nazlides, supra n. 25.
27 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 767: "ELIMINATION OF A, CONDITION BY UNJUSTIFIED PRE-
VENTION OF ITS FULFILLMENT One who unjustly prevents the performance or the hap-
pening of a condition of his own promissory duty thereby eliminates it as such a con-
dition. He will not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, and to escape
from liability for not rendering his promised performance by preventing the happening
of the condition on which it was promised."
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The court went on, however, and reversed the trial court because of
insufficient evidence as to the tortfeasor's non-insurance. Thus the court
refused to apply a res judicata principle on these facts. At the trial of
Perkins and Smith, plaintiff's attorney testified as to their non-insurance,
as declarations against financial interest, an exception to the hearsay
rule'2  but failed to show that they were unavailable, a necessary pre-
requisite for it apply in IllinoisY9 It appears further that plaintiff made
a substantial error in the Smith-Perkins suit by including in his motion for
judgment, loss of use and repairs to his car which is obviously not "bodily
injury" as the endorsement requires.30
The decision is further complicated by the dissent of Burke, P. J. who
held that the uninsured motorist endorsement did not even apply because
plaintiffs had clearly violated the "no action without consent" section of
the policy. He stated further that it was no violation of public policy that
this section and the arbitration provisions present a dilemma with no ap-
parent solution to the insured.8 ' But it is very difficult to see how the
insurer can be compelled to permit suit or be sued since in Illinois insured
cannot enforce the arbitration provision.
The third decision involving these points was Childs v. Allstate Ins.
Co.,32 which arose in South Carolina. Plaintiff's insurance company, de-
cided that plaintiff Childs was at fault in a collision with Cunningham and
repaired Cunningham's car. Childs notified the company and sued Cun-
ningham for personal injuries received in the collision, recovering a judg-
ment for $1,500. Defendant, insurer, had not consented to Childs' suit
against Cunningham and interposed plaintiff's failure to arbitrate (the
policy provided either party could demand arbitration), and failure to
obtain insured's consent, as defenses to plaintiff's action. The trial court
rendered judgment for plaintiff and insurer appealed. The South Carolina
Supreme Court, affirming a judgment for plaintiff, held the arbitration
agreement unenforceable as an attempt to arbitrate the question of legal
liability, and that plaintiff, after being denied relief without legal basis,
could maintain an action at law to recover the damages to which it was
entitled under the policy.
It seems that in the absence of any discovery or showing of mistake in
plaintiff's action against the tortfeasor, the South Carolina court applied
the doctrine of res judicata as was applied in the Boughton case. The
Childs case does not discuss whether there was conflicting evidence as to
28 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1460 (3d ed. 1940).
29 German Ins. Co. v. Bartlett, 188 Ill. 165, 58 N.E. 1075 (1900).
80 USAA Policy, Part IV, Coverage 1, Uninsured Motorist.
31Levy v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 31 111. App. 2d 157, 167, 175 N.E. 2d 607, 612
(1961) (dissenting opinion).
32 117 S.E. 2d 867 (So. Car. 1961),
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tortfeasor's non-insurance but presumably the insurance company would
have raised that as a defense in the instant case.
The remaining decision is Kirouac v. Healey,33 decided in New Hamp-
shire in 1962. In this jurisdiction contracts to arbitrate future disputes are
valid by statute.34 According to the policy, either party could demand
arbitration but it was the sole method by which liability could be estab-
lished. Plaintiff was injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist and
after notice to his insurance company, sued the tortfeasor for damages.
The insurance company appeared specially and moved for dismissal on
the grounds that on such a claim plaintiff's insurance policy provided for
arbitration only. The trial court granted the motion and plaintiff appealed.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the insurance company
had no standing to interfere with plaintiff's exercise of his right to recover
damages against defendant in a jury trial. Noting that the policy did not
apply if plaintiff proceeded to judgment without the company's consent,
the court pointed up the fact that New Hampshire's statutes 5 preserve
insured's right to trial by jury; but did not decide the question whether
the policy limitation was invalid. Neither did the court decide whether
the insurer would be bound by the finding in the suit against the uninsured
motorist.
It is still too early to determine what the weight of authority will be in
interpreting the uninsured motorist endorsement. It is highly probable
that in those jurisdictions where contracts to arbitrate future disputes are
void, the line in the Boughton and Levy cases may be followed: that
plaintiff is not bound by violating the arbitration provision in the policy
and can sue the tortfeasor without the consent of the insurer and that in
the absence of substantial error either raised by the insurer or discovered
by the court, the court will apply the principle or res judicata both as to
the question of legal liability and the amount of damages.
Similarly, in the Childs case, the implication in that decision is that the
insured need not be bound by the arbitration provision, need not have the
company's permission to sue his tortfeasor and in the absence of substan-
tial error, the award against the tortfeasor will settle the questions of the
company's liability and damages. It may be significant that in the Childs
case the court reached this decision without any reference to the Bough-
ton case which was the only similar case decided before it. This may be a
manifestation of the modern tendency to strictly construe the written
contract against the party composing it.
As to those jurisdictions where contracts to settle future disputes by
88 181 A. 2d 634 (N.H. 1962).
4 N.H.R.S.A. ch. 542, S§ 1-10 (1955).
35 N.H.R.S.A. ch. 268, S 8 (Supp. 1961).
